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THE CHOICE BETWEEN CORPORATE AND STRUCTURED FINANCING: 
EVIDENCE FROM NEW CORPORATE BORROWINGS 
 
Abstract 
We examine the factors that influence non-financial firms’ choice between corporate financing 
(CF) and structured finance (SF). Using a sample of 4,970 Western European deals closed 
between 2000 and 2016, we find that floatation costs, information asymmetry, and 
renegotiation and liquidation risks affect firms’ financing decisions. Findings also suggest that 
firms choose SF when they are less creditworthy and seek long-term financing, and that firms 
resorting to project finance are smaller and less profitable and have lower short-term debt, 
lower asset tangibility, and less growth opportunities than corporate bond issuers have. Firms 
that prefer asset securitization to corporate bonds tend to be smaller, more levered, and less 
profitable and have lower proportions of fixed assets. Finally, findings are consistent with the 
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The Choice between Corporate and Structured Financing: Evidence from New 
Corporate Borrowings 
1. Introduction 
Corporate financial structure arrangements go well beyond the choice of the debt-equity 
mix, encompassing also, within the debt securities category, security design features, such as 
placement structure, maturity structure, and on- or off-balance sheet financing, as is the case 
of structured financed (SF) transactions such as project finance and asset securitization. 
Despite the market relevance, both in terms of number and aggregated market value of 
SF issuances in the last decades,1 prior research on corporate debt financing choice focused 
primarily on the choice between bank financing and bond financing [Diamond (1991b), 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami 
et al. (1999), Cantillo and Wright (2000), Denis and Mihov (2003), Altunbas et al. (2010)]. 
Albeit that this stream of literature makes predictions about the relationship between 
debt source preferences and firm characteristics, it has devoted little attention to the choice 
between on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet financing. In addition, despite insightful 
predictions from the security design literature, the choice between SF and corporate financing 
(CF) has received relatively little academic analysis. Therefore, this important firm decision 
remains an empirical question. 
The paper aims at filling this gap in the literature examining how firms choose between 
CF and SF transactions. SF is related to the design of financial instruments based on the use of 
contracting mechanisms to off-balance sheet financing of a specified asset (or pool of assets), 
meeting, as closely as possible, the needs and expectations of its originator/owner, and 
                                                 
1 Considering project finance funding, in 2016, $62.6 billion and $33.8 billion were arranged in W.E. and the 
U.S., respectively – $230.9 billion arranged worldwide during 2016, which compares with $217 billion reported 
for 2001 [Esty and Sesia (2007)]. According to Thomson Reuters, in comparison with other financing 
mechanisms, the project finance market – in both W.E. and the U.S. – was smaller than both the corporate bond 
and the asset securitization markets in 2016. However, the amount invested in project finance was larger than the 
amounts raised through IPOs or venture capital funds. 
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investors’ expected return [Fabozzi et al. (2006) and Leland (2007)]. For our study, SF includes 
project finance and asset securitization deals while CF refers to corporate bond deals.2 
It is a truism saying that, in an economy à la Modigliani and Miller (1958), the decision 
between CF and SF is irrelevant. In this framework, tranching,3 or the act of encapsulating an 
initiative or a pool of assets in an ad hoc organization, would, consequently, not matter also. 
By implication, market imperfections and frictions of different nature, would make tranching 
and off-balance sheet financing relevant.4 
Prior theoretical research on firm debt choices, addresses the coexistence of bank and 
bond financing [Diamond (1991b), Rajan (1992), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Yosha 
(1995), Bolton and Freixas (2000), and Fiore and Uhlig (2011)]. While some authors argue that 
bank financing holds a significant advantage [Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), 
Berlin and Loyes (1988), and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)], Diamond (1991b) and Rajan 
(1992) predict a hump-shaped relationship between firm quality and debt source. Although this 
literature relates debt source preferences and firm characteristics, it pays little attention to the 
choice between structured and traditional corporate debt financing instruments. 
Additionally, in the related empirical literature, this debt financing choice is also an 
under-researched topic. Although, Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami 
et al. (1999), Cantillo and Wright (2000), Denis and Mihov (2003), and Altunbas et al. (2010) 
examine the debt choice generic topic, the main focus of their papers relates the use of public 
bonds to borrowers’ characteristics, such as size, age, leverage, liquidity, growth opportunities, 
                                                 
2 Asset securitization, project finance, structured leasing, and leveraged acquisitions (mostly LBOs), are all 
different forms of SF. In our study, we rely on project finance and asset securitization because there is no public 
information on structured leasing transactions and some LBOs are implemented without an SPV to facilitate the 
deal, which is a key element of SF [see, among others, Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), and 
Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. 
3 Tranching means the creation of multiple types of securities backed by firm’s assets, or by the underlying asset 
pool, when considering asset securitization. See DeMarzo (2005) and Leland (2007) for further details. 
4 Finnerty (1988), Oldfield (1997), Caselli and Gatti (2005), DeMarzo (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006) document 
that SF mitigates agency problems and information asymmetries, and improves risk management, suggesting that 
SF does matter because it reduces the deadweight costs associated with market frictions and imperfections. 
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and profitability. The focus of our paper, however, investigates a different debt financing 
choice: SF versus CF. Perhaps the most closely related work to ours is Altunbas et al. (2010), 
which investigates factors relevant to European firms’ choices between corporate bonds and 
syndicated loans, disregarding project finance deals. 
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by investigating the determinants of the 
choice between CF and SF. We use a comprehensive sample of project finance, asset 
securitization, and corporate bond deals closed in Western European countries between January 
1, 2000 and December 31, 2016. Our sample contains 582 project finance deals (worth €149.77 
billion), 170 asset securitization deals (worth €130.73 billion), and 4,218 corporate bond deals 
(worth €2,778.13 billion), closed by 240, 77, and 791 non-financial firms, respectively. 
Our results regarding corporate borrower choice between SF and CF transactions 
support hypotheses related to information asymmetry, floatation cost, and renegotiation and 
liquidation risks. We find that corporate borrowers choose SF when they seek long-term 
financing and are less creditworthy. Further, firms employing project financing over corporate 
financing tend to be smaller, less profitable and have lower short-term debt to total debt, lower 
asset tangibility, and less growth opportunities. Firms prefer project financing when issuing 
relatively lower amounts of debt and are located in countries with higher creditor rights. Firms 
employing asset securitizations instead of corporate bonds are typically smaller, more levered 
and less profitable; these firms also tend to have lower asset tangibility. Corporates seeking 
relatively higher amounts of debt and funding cost reductions prefer asset securitizations. 
Moreover, firms that access both SF and CF markets differ fundamentally from those reliant 
on either market, alone. Finally, we show that transaction cost considerations lead firms that 
use both SF and CF during our sample period to choose SF for new debt. 
In line with SF literature, our results indicate that, ceteris paribus, the weighted average 
spread (WAS) is significantly lower for AS deals than for CF ones. When compared with 
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corporate bond deals, asset securitization deals are associated with a statistically significant 
WAS reduction of 91.12 bps. Our results do not corroborate the hypothesis raised by the SF 
literature that the funding cost on SF is lower than the funding cost on CF for project finance 
transactions.  
This paper extends the literature on debt financing decisions in several ways. First, 
unlike prior research, our empirical analysis distinguishes between SF and CF. SF is an 
economically significant, growing financial market segment, but academic papers that have 
dealt with the subject are very limited. As such, it warrants separate examination. In 2014, a 
joint paper prepared by the Bank of England and the ECB points to the need for a better 
functioning of SF and securitization market in the European Union due to its important role as 
a funding alternative to traditional bank credit. The European Commission is boosting 
infrastructure investments, and by doing so is supporting the use of project finance, to fund a 
2 trillion-euro investment between 2017 and 2020. Second, to our knowledge, this study is the 
first to investigate factors underlying firm choices between on- and off-balance sheet funding 
by analyzing firm issuance of corporate bonds versus asset securitization bonds and the choice 
between CF and project financing. Third, our study explores for the first time why corporates 
use asset securitization. Fourth, unlike prior studies on debt choice, we examine the choice of 
new debt, rather than the proportions of existing bank and bond financing. We investigate debt 
choices using a unique dataset of CF and SF deals carefully assembled and hand-matched from 
multiple sources. Finally, unlike prior studies, we examine the impact of the cost of funding on 
the debt choice. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
theoretical and empirical background regarding SF and connects it with security design and 
debt choice literatures. Section 3 presents our methodology and data. This section also 
characterizes our sample of deals and describes the firm’s accounting and market 
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characteristics. Section 4 examines the determinants of firm debt choices and discusses our 
robustness checks. Section 5 examines if SF deals have a lower cost of funding than corporate 
bond deals. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1. The financial economics of structured finance 
SF transactions are usually designed, namely in terms of covenants, warrantees, 
governance structure, and trusts, to achieve segregation of the pool of assets or cash flows, 
from the originator or sponsor of the transaction. This is achieved by setting up a vehicle 
company created with the sole purpose of implementing the transaction. Additionally, credit 
enhancement mechanisms are also implemented, such as the use of warrantees to enhance 
recoveries, and tranching to define risk attachment points [DeMarzo (2005) and Leland 
(2007)].  
According to extant literature, the primary motives for using SF include: (i) mitigating 
costs of market imperfections and frictions; (ii) funding projects which otherwise could not be 
financed; (iii) reducing funding costs, when the reduction in the cost of funding is larger than 
the cost of the required credit enhancements; (iv) maintaining sponsors’ financial slack; (v) 
transferring risk more effectively; and (vi) reducing tax liability through tax shields [Esty 
(2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), DeMarzo (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. The literature 
also documents that SF is prone to inefficiencies, particularly, when used inappropriately or 
imprudently.5  
Project finance (PF) structures are typically used for funding capital-intensive facilities 
and utilities, based on a standalone entity, a special purpose vehicle (SPV), typically highly 
                                                 
5 As argued by Brunnermeier (2009), Coval et al. (2009), Gorton (2009), and Gorton and Metrick (2013), 




levered, and financial claims concentrated ownership. Due to their contractual idiosyncrasies, 
they can also be used for segregating projects’ credit risk from the sponsors’ [e.g., Brealey et 
al. (1996), Esty (2003), and Corielli et al. (2010)].  
Asset securitization (AS) structures allow that cash flow generating assets being pooled 
together and transferred to a specially set up entity which, subsequently, issues securities in the 
form of debt instruments [Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Gorton and 
Metrick (2013)]. According to Fabozzi et al. (2006), the reasons a non-financial borrowers may 
elect to issue an ABS are: (i) mitigating the deadweight costs associated with asymmetric 
information and agency problems; (ii) improving liquidity and diversify funding sources; and 
(iii) maintaining sponsors’ financial flexibility. 
2.2. Determinants of firms’ debt choices 
To date, the choice between SF and CF has been relatively underlooked in the debt 
financing literature, which focuses primarily on the choice between public and private debt. 
That literature clusters around three main hypotheses. The flotation costs hypothesis, which 
posits that because small public debt issues are not cost-efficient, firms issue public bonds only 
for larger borrowings [Houston and James (1996), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Esho et al. 
(2001), and Denis and Mihov (2003)]. The renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis, which 
predicts that borrowers with a higher probability of financial distress are far less likely to 
borrow publicly [Berlin and Loyes (1988), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Cantillo and 
Wright (2000), Esho et al. (2001), Denis and Mihov (2003), and Fiore and Uhlig (2011)]. The 
information asymmetry hypothesis, which suggests that firms facing higher incentives from 
asymmetric information, are expected to borrow privately [Diamond (1984, 1991b), Boyd and 




Finally, security design literature is also potentially relevant in explaining borrowers’ 
decisions to resort to SF transactions. Diamond (1993), as hypothesized in Allen and Winton 
(1995), Hart and Moore (1995), Winton (1995), and Sannikov (2013), argues that the design 
and issuance of debt securities with different degrees of seniority, can mitigate agency 
problems and reduce monitoring costs. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
The literature review helps us to develop the following three hypotheses with respect 
to the choice between SF and CF. 
Active monitoring by a lender can be helpful in mitigating agency costs associated with 
moral hazard [Diamond (1984, 1991b)]. Thus, as argued in Diamond (1984) and Boyd and 
Prescott (1986), banks may be more efficient monitors than public bond markets. In this 
framework, when information about the true quality of a borrower is asymmetrically 
distributed, bank loans may be preferred to corporate bonds (CB). We thus expect firms facing 
high information asymmetry costs to choose PF because banks can more efficiently reduce 
such costs through monitoring. Additionally, Diamond (1993), Hart and Moore (1995), and 
Winton (1995) argue that in AS, the design and issuance of different classes of securities with 
different degrees of seniority may reduce monitoring costs. Finally, Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991a, 1993) point out that short-term debt can reduce adverse selection costs of 
new debt issues, since its higher frequency of repricing (compared to longer maturity debt) 
allows an earlier incorporation of incoming new information. Thus, similarly to Flannery 
(1986) and Diamond (1991a) predictions, we expect borrowers seeking to minimize liquidity 
risk costs associated with debt refinancing, will choose longer-term borrowing; i.e., will prefer 
SF to CF. 
Hypothesis 1 [H1]: The use of SF reduces asymmetric information problems and 
enables borrowers to obtain funding with longer maturities. 
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According to the flotation costs hypothesis [Houston and James (1996), Krishnaswami 
et al. (1999), Esho et al. (2001), and Denis and Mihov (2003)], small public debt issues are not 
cost-effective. Therefore, firms choose public debt over private when the issue is sufficiently 
large. This might suggest that firms may choose PF over CB for relatively small amounts of 
debt. However, considering that structuring a PF transaction is costlier than CF – PF transaction 
are expensive to set up, take a long time to execute, and are highly restrictive once in place 
[Fabozzi et al. (2006) and Gatti et al. (2013)] –, we also expect that relatively small PF 
transactions would also not be cost-effective. Similarly, Fender and Mitchell (2005) and 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) point out that AS transactions have higher transaction costs vis-à-vis CB. 
Thus, we expect borrowers to choose AS for relatively large debt borrowings because of 
potential economies of scale on flotation costs. 
Hypothesis 2 [H2]: Borrowers choose SF over CF when issuing relatively large 
amounts of debt. 
The renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis suggests that borrowers facing higher 
financial distress probability are less likely to borrow publicly, since renegotiation may be less 
complicated using bank debt [Berlin and Loyes (1988) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), 
Esho et al. (2001), and Altunbas et al. (2010)]. Because of restrictive covenants, direct credit 
monitoring, and ex post renegotiation, SF transactions resemble more closely private placement 
bonds than (publicly offered) CB [Kwan and Carleton (2010)]. These characteristics make SF 
more effective in mitigating agency conflicts between borrowers and lenders. Thus, SF 
transactions seem particularly well suited for risky borrowers with high agency costs of debt. 
Finally, considering that both PF loans and AS bonds are off-balance sheet transactions, we 
predict that higher levered firms will choose SF over CF to improve or maintain key financial 




Hypothesis 3 [H3]: Risky firms with high agency costs of debt are more likely to choose 
PF and AS over CB. 
 
3. Methodology, data, and sample characterization 
3.1. Methodology 
The main objective of our analysis is to study how Western European corporates choose 
between CF and SF, namely to investigate how firm’s characteristics, contractual features, and 
macroeconomic variables affect the choice between AS and CB deals and PF and CB deals. 
For this analysis, we utilize a logistic regression model.6 Our dependent variable, choice of 
debt, is a binary variable equal to 1 if the sponsor/originator closes a PF deal or an AS deal and 
0 if it, instead, closes a CB deal. We thus model the choice between PF and CB deals and 
between AS and CB deals as follows: 
𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜑 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where the subscripts refers to deal i at time t. Next, we identify the explanatory variables 
used as well as the expected impact on the choice process. Regarding corporate characteristics, 
we focus on accounting and market corporate characteristics that reflect transaction costs, 
renegotiation and liquidation risks, and information asymmetries. Table 1 details these 
variables and the effect observed in our results. 
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
Following the arguments presented by Diamond (1984, 1991b) and Boyd and Prescott 
(1986) we expect that firms with higher information asymmetry may prefer PF to CB. Firm 
size and market-to-book ratio are commonly used as proxies for incentive problems related to 
                                                 
6 The logistic regression is used in cases of dichotomous dependent variable (in our case, PF deal versus CB deal 
or AS deal versus CB deal). An alternative to the logistic regression analysis is a probit regression. We find similar 
results using either model; our probit analysis is available upon request. 
12 
 
information asymmetries [Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Esho et al. (2001), Denis and Mihov 
(2003), and Altunbas et al. (2010)]. We thus expect smaller firms and firms with lower market-
to-book ratios to choose PF over CB because banks can more efficiently reduce such costs 
through monitoring. We also use market-to-book ratio to gauge a firm’s growth potential. As 
identified by Smith and Watts (1992) and Barclay and Smith (1995), expected future growth 
increases a firm’s market-to-book. This forward-looking ratio reflects investor expectations 
about a firm’s cash flow potential. Because such cash flows allow the firm to securitize assets, 
we expect a positive association between market-to-book and the probability of choosing AS 
over CB. 
To investigate if risky firms with high agency costs of debt are more likely to choose 
SF over CB, we use debt to total assets and short-term debt to total debt to proxy for a 
borrowers’ level of financial constraint. Empirically, while some authors document a positive 
relationship between public debt issuance and proxies for borrower financial distress [Houston 
and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Cantillo and Wright (2000), 
and Denis and Mihov (2003)], Esho et al. (2001) and Altunbas et al. (2010) find a negative 
association between financial leverage and public debt issuance. Firms with more debt to total 
assets likely face higher financial risk. Therefore, renegotiation may be more complicated 
using public debt [Berlin and Loeys (1988) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)]. 
Considering that both PF and AS deals are off-balance sheet transactions, we predict that higher 
levered firms will choose SF over CB to improve or maintain key financial ratios [Caselli and 
Gatti (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. This argument is even stronger for short-term debt to 
total debt, as it is a more direct proxy for firms’ financial distress [Diamond (1991b) and Esho 
et al. (2001)]. 
Asset tangibility, proxied for by fixed assets to total assets, reflects a firms’ liquidation 
value. All else equal, higher asset tangibility increases a creditor’s expected recovery in default. 
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Because PF is most commonly used for off-balance sheet capital-intensive projects, we expect 
this ratio to negatively influence the probability of a sponsoring firm choosing a PF over a CB 
deal. Conversely, we expect the probability of a non-financial firm choosing AS over CB to 
increase with the proportion of fixed assets; a higher ratio implies more cash flows eligible for 
securitization. Profitability is measured as return on assets. According to Denis and Mihov 
(2003), profitable firms are more likely to utilize public debt to signal managerial aptitude for 
generating earnings. We, thus, expect return on assets to relate negatively to the probability of 
SF issuance.  
Because financing choice may be sector-specific, we use dummy variables to control 
for industry factors. Additionally, a dummy variable – switcher – identifies firms that employ 
multiple debt types within our sample period. 
Following the flotation costs hypothesis, we might expect that non-financial firms 
choose PF over CB for relatively small amounts of debt. However, according to Fender and 
Mitchell (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Gatti et al. (2013), structuring an SF transaction is 
costlier than traditional debt instruments. We thus have to analyze which of the hypotheses – 
flotation costs versus transaction costs – will have more preponderance on the firms’ debt 
choice between PF and CF. Regarding the choice between AS and CB, we expect that firms 
choose AS for relatively large amounts of debt to economize on scale. Firm size can also test 
the flotation cost argument. Empirical studies document a positive relationship between public 
debt financing and firm size [Houston and James (1996), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Esho et 
al. (2001), and Denis and Mihov (2003)]. Therefore, we expect smaller firms to choose PF over 
CB. Only relatively large firms who would benefit from economies of scale would prefer AS 
over CB. 
We control for other deals’ contractual characteristics, namely, weighted average 
maturity, number of tranches and number of banks per deal. Flannery (1986) and Diamond 
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(1991a, 1993) point out that when information about the true quality of firm’s assets is 
asymmetrically distributed, outsiders may perceive short-term debt issues as a signal of assets 
quality. Thus, we hypothesize that a borrower seeking relatively longer-term funding will 
choose PF and AS over CB to reduce information asymmetry problems and enabling longer-
term borrowing. 
We account for macroeconomic conditions using proxies for sovereign default risk, 
interest rate levels, market volatility, and the term structure of interest rates, along with dummy 
variables for financial crisis and U.K. borrowers. Finally, we control for creditor rights using 
La Porta’s et al. (1998) and Spamann’s (2010) indices.7 
3.2. Data 
The data for this project come from four different sources. We use DCM Analytics and 
Loan Analytics databases to select the Western European non-financial firms that issued CB, 
were sponsors in PF deals and originators in AS deals in the 2000-2016 period.8 DCM 
Analytics contains information on publicly traded AS bonds, CB and PF bonds while Loan 
Analytics details PF loans. We use Loan Analytics database to identify sponsors in PF deals 
because the information provided by DCM Analytics about PF bond issues is scant, since the 
worldwide PF bond market represent only about 10 to 20% of the total debt market for PF 
transactions [Gatti (2014)]. We also use these databases to gather information on the deals 
contractual characteristics.9 Although DCM Analytics includes several bond types, we retain 
only those with a deal type code of “corporate bond-investment-grade” and “corporate bond-
high yield” for CB, “asset-backed security” (ABS), “mortgage-backed security” (MBS), and 
                                                 
7 The supply-side of debt markets differ across countries, industries, and time. In our model, we control for country 
risk, interest rate level, and industry dummies to account for these supply-side conditions. 
8 For this study, we define Western Europe as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom. 
9 Information is available on the micro characteristics of the loans and bonds (e.g., deal and loan/bond size, 
maturity, currency, pricing, rating) and of the issuers/sponsors (e.g., name, nationality, industry sector). 
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“collateralized-debt obligation” (CDO) for AS, and “project finance” for PF. For CB, deals 
with perpetual bonds and bonds with additional features such as step-up, caps, or floors were 
excluded from our sample. We also excluded AS synthetic deals. While Loan Analytics 
contains historical information about syndicated loans and related banking instruments, we 
examine only deals with a specific purpose code of “project finance”. We also require, for both 
databases, that the deal status is closed or completed, and that the deal amount be available.  
We rely on Thomson Reuters Datastream database to get information on firms’ 
accounting and market data and link debt choice to firm attributes observed in the fiscal year 
ending just prior to debt issuance. Like DCM Analytics and Loan Analytics databases, this 
database does not provide an identification code, so we hand-matched those sponsors with a 
controlling stake in the equity of the separate PF firm with Datastream by using the sponsor 
name. Additionally, we link Datastream issuer information to DCM Analytics bond 
information by hand-matching issuer names and issuer-parent names for CB and AS bonds, 
respectively. This method allows matching the deals with the ultimate party responsible for the 
financing choice decision between SF and CB deals.10 
Lastly, macroeconomic data, such as interest rate levels, market volatility, and the Euro 
swap curve slope is obtained from Bloomberg. We link macroeconomic information with debt 
characteristics (DCM Analytics and Loan Analytics) on the active date (PF deals) or issue date 
(AS and CB deals). 
3.3. Sample characterization 
Based on the data extracted from DCM Analytics and Loan Analytics databases, and 
after applying the described screens, we are left with a sample of 2,131 PF deals worth €469.76 
billion, 313 AS deals worth €230.02 billion, and 6,146 CB deals worth €3,489.03 billion. As 
                                                 
10 Considering that in SF transactions the borrower is a special purpose company settled up to take on the initiative, 
we assigned AS and PF deals with sponsors (‘Borrower/Issue-Sponsor’) in a PF transaction and originators in an 
AS transaction (‘Issuer Parent’).  
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the unit of observation is the deal, multiple tranches from the same transaction appear as 
separate observations in our database; e.g., PF and AS bonds typically consist of several 
tranches funding the same SPV. Therefore, to perform a deal-level analysis we use data at the 
deal-level and, when necessary, we aggregate tranche-level data (e.g., spread and maturity). 
Some facts about deal flows provide useful background for an examination of firms’ 
choice between SF and CF. Table 2 presents the distribution by year for the full sample of PF, 
AS, and CB deals. 
**** Insert Table 2 about here **** 
Table 2 shows that PF lending peaked (by value) in 2008, fell in 2009 and rose again in 
2010 and 2011. In 2016, a record $49.40 billion in PF funding was arranged in Western Europe 
(W.E.), a 269.3% increase from the $13.38 billion reported for 2000. The issuance of AS bonds 
increased significantly until 2006, having seen an abrupt fall between 2007 and 2009 as a result 
of the important role played by AS in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 
financial turmoil. Similar patterns can be identified for both AS and CB deals, with a significant 
increase in the volume issued in W.E. in the 2012-2016 period. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the industrial distribution of the full sample of deals, 
whereas Panel B details the deal allocation to borrowers in a particular country. Panel A shows 
that while the largest share of PF deals was awarded to utility and energy (36.98%), industrial 
(33.79%) and transportation (15.26%), CB deals are concentrated in industrial and commercial 
services, with these industries accounting for 44.89% and 34.27% of all corporate bond 
lending, respectively. This finding is consistent with the common understanding that PF is used 
primarily to fund tangible-asset-rich and capital-intensive projects. AS deals reveals a far less 
concentrated industrial pattern via-à-vis PF and CB lending, with commercial industries 
receiving the highest share (37.03%) of all AS bond issuance. It is important to notice that 
state-owned firms use AS deals very often to raise funds. 
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**** Insert Table 3 about here **** 
Panel B reveals striking differences between PF lending and AS and CB lending. Panel 
B shows that AS and CB deals are concentrated in six countries; i.e., borrowers located in 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the U.K. account for 92.62% and 89.05% 
of all AS and CB deals by volume, respectively. Whereas the bulk of AS deals are located in 
the U.K. (36.30%) and Italy (23.08%), CB issuance is highly concentrated in the U.K. 
(24.07%), France (21.81%), and Germany (21.76%). On the contrary, PF lending reveals a far 
less concentrated country pattern; i.e., W.E. borrowers use PF very often to fund their 
investment projects, especially via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), which played an 
important role in reducing the need for government borrowing and shifting project risks to the 
private sector. The biggest recipients of PF lending are the U.K. (25.01%), Spain (21.02%), 
and France (10.30%). These countries account for 59.33% of the total value of PF deals. 
After we merge the firms involved in the deals in our full sample with Datastream, we 
are able to identify 4,970 firms for which we have all of the necessary data for our analysis. Of 
these firms, 582 were sponsors in PF deals, 170 originators in AS deals, and 4,218 issuers in 
CB deals. We refer to this sample as our high-information sample. 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for our high-information sample of deals. We 
compare contractual characteristics between deal types using the nonparametric Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test for continuous variables and Fisher's exact test for discrete variables. 
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
The weighted average spread (WAS)--calculated as the weighted average between the 
tranche spread and its weight in the deal size--corresponds to the deal’s economic cost of credit 
based on available information at the time of closing the loans or issuing the bonds.11 In an AS 
transaction, deals tranching is determined by the desired cost of funding. Similarly, in PF deals, 
                                                 
11 See section 5.1., for a more detailed explanation of how the WAS was calculated. 
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banks work with sponsors to determine the number and seniority of tranches. Essentially, in 
SF deals, the cost of funding is determined by the combination of the different tranches. The 
mean (median) WAS for CB is 204.34 bps (146.68 bps); mean (median) WAS for PF and AS 
deals are 210.26 bps (157.74 bps) and 67.52 bps (48.45 bps), respectively. The Wilcoxon rank-
sum test rejects the null hypothesis that the WAS is identically distributed for AS and CB deals; 
i.e., corporates face higher average WASs when issuing CB bonds than AS bonds. In contrast, 
WAS for PF and CB deals is not significantly different at the 1 percent level. These results are 
in line with the prediction of SF literature [Finnerty (1988), Oldfield (1997), Caselli and Gatti 
(2005), DeMarzo (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)], which posits that SF reduces funding costs 
vis-à-vis straight debt financing by mitigating agency problems and information asymmetries, 
for AS deals only. 
As we expected, mean (median) AS deal size of €769.01 million (€599.01 million) 
significantly exceeds that of CB deal size. On the contrary, the mean (median) PF deal size of 
€257.33 million (€137.76 million) is significantly less than the CB mean (median) deal size of 
€658.64 million (€443.11 million). This result can be explained by the fact that PF is typically 
loan based or buy-and-hold project bond based. Thus, larger PF deals, even if financed by large 
banking syndicates, may not allow the same amount of funding to be raised as in public bond 
issuances, since they constitute a larger share in lenders portfolio. Regarding country risk, we 
find that while PF borrowers are, on average, located in far riskier countries (2.79) than CB 
issuers (2.28), AS originators are located in countries with lower sovereign risk (1.52). 
The weighted average maturity (WAM) of SF deals--14.59 years and 15.52 years for 
PF and AS, respectively--is significantly higher than that of 8.28 years for CB deals. In contrast 
to traditional secured bonds in which repayment capacity stems from the issuer’s ability to 
generate sufficient cash flows (creditors are paid with firm’s cash flows; assets as collateral 
come into force in case of default), AS bond repayment prospects depend primarily on a pool 
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of future receivables pledged as collateral for the issue. Similarly, PF loan and bond maturities 
typically reflect maturities of the projects implemented by the SPV, which tend to be longer 
term. Therefore, AS and PF WAMs tend to be longer vis-à-vis traditional CB WAMs.  
AS and PF deals typically include a much larger number of tranches than CB deals; an 
average CB deal includes 1.32 tranches while average PF and AS deals have 2.01 and 2.86 
tranches, respectively. Thus, we conclude that SF transactions benefit more from separating 
the deal into several tranches with different risks, rewards and maturities. For CB deals, the 
average number of participating banks is 4.92, which is significantly larger than the AS deal 
average (2.90) but smaller than the PF deal average (5.05). This is consistent with the view that 
banks attempt to maximize the number of PF participants to spread out risk, since larger 
tranches might imply higher risk for lender since they constitute a larger share in its loan/bond 
portfolio. 
The fraction of AS bonds issued by U.K. corporates, 42.94%, is significantly higher 
than that for CB deals, 20.00%. Contrary to AS, during the crisis period W.E. corporates made 
much more frequent use of PF and CB deals than in the pre-crisis period. Finally, while the 
largest share of AS and CB deals was awarded to commercial and industrial sector--76.47% 
for AS deals and 79.21% for CB deals--, the bulk of PF lending is extended to capital-intensive 
sectors like utilities, energy and mining. 
Table 5 reports characteristics of non-financial firms that were sponsors in a PF deal, 
originators in an AS deal, or issuers in a CB issue. We subdivide these firms into six categories 
according to their borrowing record within our sample period. The PF and CB deals’ subsample 
is categorized as closing: (I) only PF deals; (II) only CB deals; and (III) both PF and CB deals. 
Similarly, the AS and CB deals’ subsample is categorized as closing: (IV) only AS deals; (V) 
only CB deals; and (VI) both AS and CB deals. 
**** Insert Table 5 about here **** 
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On average, borrowers that used only PF deals are smaller and have lower short-term 
debt levels, and lower profitability than those accessing CB markets, exclusively. These results 
are not surprising. PF is of great demand when it does not substantially impact the balance 
sheet and allows maintaining the key financial ratios. Financial leverage, fixed assets to total 
assets, and market-to-book ratios do not differ at the 1% significance levels for the two subsets 
of firms. 
As expected, firms utilizing both markets are much larger than those reliant on either, 
exclusively. With average size of €64.00 billion, firms in category [III] have borrowing needs 
and capacity to use both CB and PF markets extensively. They have relatively lower short-term 
debt to total debt and market-to-book ratios than firms using only PF or CB deals do. Firms 
that used simultaneously PF and CB are less levered, have a higher asset tangibility and lower 
profitability when compared with firms that issued CB only. Financial leverage, asset 
tangibility and return on assets are similar for firms in categories [I] and [III]. 
Borrowers that use only AS deals are more levered and have lower profitability than 
those using only CB. However, size and short-term debt to total debt, fixed assets to total assets 
and market-to-book ratios do not differ at the 1% significance levels for the firms in categories 
[IV] and [V]. Again, firms accessing both AS and CB markets are much larger than those 
employing only one deal type. Category [VI] firms have higher short-term debt levels than 
firms using only AS or CB. Firms that access both markets are more levered and have lower 
market to book and return on asset ratios than CB-only issuers. Finally, asset tangibility is 
similar for firms in categories [IV], [V] and [VI]. 
 
4. Determinants of a firms’ debt choice 
Building on debt choice, structured finance, and security design literature, we 
investigate how non-financial firm’s characteristics influence the choice between SF and CF 
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(PF versus CB and AS versus CB), while controlling for contractual characteristics and 
macroeconomic factors. As previously mentioned, we use a unique dataset, compiled from four 
different data providers (DCM Analytics, Loan Analytics, Datastream and Bloomberg). 
4.1. Base model results 
Table 6 reports the results achieved by applying the logistic regression (1) predicting 
firms’ choices of debt between PF and CB deals and between AS and CB deals. In model [1], 
we link 972 firms’ choice of debt for 4,800 PF and CB deals, while in model [2] we link 827 
firms’ choice of debt for 4,388 AS and CB deals. 
**** Insert Table 6 about here **** 
We find that smaller firms are more likely to raise funds through PF than CF. In line 
with previous empirical studies, we find deal size to negatively affect the probability of closing 
PF deals instead of public CB deals. Taking these results together, we corroborate the flotation 
costs hypothesis for PF. We, thus, find that the flotation costs argument is more preponderant 
than the transaction costs argument on the firms’ debt choice between PF and CF. Concerning 
the choice between AS and CB deals, we do not find evidence that firms choose AS when 
issuing larger amounts of debt to benefit from economies of scale. 
Regarding the asymmetric information hypothesis, we find that firms with potential 
asymmetric information problems, relatively smaller ones and with lower market-to-book 
ratios prefer PF deals. Concerning the choice between AS and CB, we find an insignificant 
relationship between the market-to-book ratio and the probability of observing an AS deal; i.e., 
the investor expectations about a firm’s cash flow potential does not affect the probability of 
observing an AS deal vis-à-vis a CB deal. In addition, when we use firm size as a proxy for 
information asymmetry, our results show that smaller firms choose AS over CB deals. Finally, 
our results support security design literature [Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991a, 1993)], 
which predicts that SF reduces asymmetric information problems and enables borrowers to 
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obtain funding with longer maturities. Overall, our findings indicate that asymmetric 
information problems can be reduced using transactions specifically structured through an SPV 
and secured by ring-fenced assets that produce cash flows solely to support the transaction. 
Results document that financial leverage does not impact the choice between PF and 
CB deals. Contrary to what expected, we report a negative relationship between short-term debt 
level and likelihood to access PF markets. This might be explained by the fact that PF 
transactions are complex in terms of designing the transaction and writing the required 
documentation and involve significant due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. Hence, 
structuring a PF deal takes more time and entails greater transaction costs than CF. Therefore, 
it makes sense that firms with a higher level of debt maturing in the short-term tend to resort 
to CB deals to cover their financing needs as they take relatively less time to implement. We 
also find that more levered firms tend to choose AS over CB. This finding is unsurprising 
because AS allows sponsors to maintain financial flexibility and protect their credit capacity 
through off-balance sheet financing. In this context, we interpret high financial leverage as a 
financial distress factor [Esho et al. (2001)] and not as a reputational factor [Houston and James 
(1996), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Cantillo and Wright (2000), and Denis 
and Mihov (2003)]. Thus, in accord with the renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis, we find 
that AS transactions more effectively mitigate agency conflicts between borrowers and lenders. 
As expected, higher asset tangibility is negatively associated with firm preference of PF 
over CB. This supports the prediction from earlier information asymmetry literature: private 
borrowers have significantly lower asset tangibility than public issuers [Denis and Mihov 
(2003)]. However, in contrast to what expected, the fixed assets to total assets ratio affects 
negatively the probability of observing AS over CB. We find that profitability reduces the 
likelihood of accessing both PF and AS markets, which corroborates SF literature [Caselli and 
Gatti (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006)] that states that firms choose SF over CF to improve 
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sponsors’ key financial ratios. Our results for PF deals mirror those of Denis and Mihov (2003), 
who report that profitable firms are more likely to issue public rather than private debt. 
However, our findings contradict those of Altunbas et al. (2010), who show that profitability 
increases firms’ likelihood of choosing syndicated loans over public debt. 
Results show clearly that PF transactions are typically used for funding capital-
intensive facilities and utilities, while AS deals are less frequently used to raise funds in the 
utility and energy, and industrial sectors. We also find that firms, which employ both SF and 
CF within our sample period, are more likely to choose SF deals when issuing new debt. 
Sponsors that have already participated in SF face lower transaction costs. This is no surprise 
as SF transactions are expensive to orchestrate and take longer to execute. 
As expected, the number of tranches positively influence the probability of observing 
an AS deal or a PF deal versus a CB deal. The creation of multiple types of securities backed 
by the firm’s (or by the underlying asset pool, when considering securitization) assets is 
considered one of the most important features that distinguishes SF instruments from 
traditional debt products. In AS, deals’ originators exploit market factors to their advantage via 
tranching of AS bonds. In PF, a collection of banks – bank syndicate – jointly extends several 
loans to a specific borrower (SPV) in order to spread risks. This argument also explains why 
we find a positive relationship between the number of banks and the probability of observing 
a PF deal. Unexpectedly, the number of banks impacts negatively the choice between AS and 
CB deals.  
Regarding macroeconomic variables, the country risk, the level of interest rates and the 
yield curve slope do not affect the choice between SF and CF deals. A new deal closed by a 
borrower located in the U.K. is less likely to be structured as PF than CF. This can be explained 
by the important role played by PF, especially Public-Private Partnerships, in reducing the need 
for government borrowing and shifting project risks to the private sector in Southern European 
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countries. Sponsors located in countries with better creditor rights positively affect the 
probability of observing a PF deal rather than a CB deal. This can be explained by the fact that 
in PF transactions, which are characterized by leveraged capital structures, syndicated banks 
advance more quickly with these structures when have a higher creditor rights level. In 
addition, in periods of higher volatility in capital markets, firms tend toward PF. Finally, due 
to AS bonds’ prominent role in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, the crisis dummy variable reflects a lower probability of observing this debt type during 
the crisis. Note, though, that the remaining macroeconomic variables do not affect the 
likelihood of observing an AS versus a CB deal. 
By comparing SF and CF debt choices, we find strong evidence that SF facilitates the 
reduction of the deadweight costs from asymmetric information problems, which corroborates 
H1. Results only corroborate the flotation costs hypothesis for PF [H2] and we only find 
evidence that risky firms with high agency costs of debt are more likely to choose SF over CF 
for AS [H3]. SF deals allow sponsors/originators to maintain financial flexibility by creating 
non-recourse vehicle entities to carry the debt. In turn, this helps sponsors protect their credit 
standing and future access to financial markets. Our results show that firms utilizing PF are 
smaller and less profitable and have lower short-term debt to total debt, lower asset tangibility, 
and less growth opportunities than CB issuers have. Firms that prefer AS over CB, tend to be 
smaller, more levered, and less profitable and have lower proportions of fixed assets. 
4.2. The impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on the firms’ debt choice 
Table 7 includes re-estimation of models [1] and [2] for two sub-periods to examine 
whether debt financing choices change over time. Specifically, all transactions before the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 14, 2008 constitute the pre-crisis period while 
transactions thereafter occur in the crisis period. This section analyzes firm choice between SF 
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and CF for 133 AS, 1,602 CB and 202 PF deals closed in the pre-crisis period, and for 37 AS, 
2,696 CB and 383 PF deals closed in the crisis period. 
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
Results from models [1a] and [1b] show interesting changes in firm attributes and 
macroeconomic factors between the two sub-periods. Regarding firms’ characteristics, both 
debt to total assets and short-term debt to total debt ratios lose significance over the crisis 
period. In addition, utility and energy dummy variable begins to positive influence the 
probability of observing a PF transaction during the crisis. While market volatility only 
determines a firm’s participation in both PF and CB markets during the crisis, the Euro swap 
curve slope no longer affects the likelihood of PF issuance. Importantly, regardless of the 
period considered, our results continue to corroborate H1 and H2; i.e., smaller firms use PF 
over CB when seek long-term financing and want to raise relatively smaller amounts of debt. 
Our results also show that in both periods, firms utilizing PF are less profitable and have lower 
asset tangibility than CB issuers. 
Regarding the choice between AS and CB deals (models [2a] and [2b]), we note that 
explanatory factors in borrower choice shift from default and creditor protection factors 
(leverage, country risk and creditor rights) to marketability factors (firm size, asset tangibility 
and deal size). However, it is important to notice that the results for the crisis period have to be 
analyzed carefully, since we only have information for 37 AS deals. We believe that this 
analysis with a higher number of observations presents an important opportunity for future 
research. In relation to the pre-crisis period, the results validate the renegotiation and 
liquidation hypothesis: leverage and short-term debt to total debt ratios impact positively the 
choice between AS and CB deals. Finally, the significant positive relationship between country 
risk and the likelihood of observing an AS transaction during the pre-crisis period is not 
surprising, as AS transactions allow the issuance of bonds with higher credit ratings than that 
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of the originators. Considering that, there is a direct relationship between the countries’ credit 
risk and that of the originators, companies located in countries with worse ratings benefit more 
from this type of SF deals. 
4.3. The role of credit risk and funding costs on the firms’ debt choice 
In this section, we subject the various high-information samples to logistic regression 
analyses, with two objectives. First, we examine whether the credit risk of firms affect the 
choice between SF and CF. According to Hill (1996), Riddiough (1997) and Fabozzi et al. 
(2006), firms with high-quality assets and with low credit ratings may be able to raise debt 
through SF transactions without deteriorating their creditworthiness and with better funding 
conditions. This is clearer for AS deals because in AS, bond tranches can have higher credit 
ratings or be otherwise less risky than the originator’s general obligations. We use the Z-score 
as a proxy for a firms’ credit risk and expect a negative relationship to the choice of PF and AS 
vis-à-vis CB deals. Second, we investigate if the cost of funding affects the firms’ debt choice. 
The SF literature points out that one of the principal reasons a non-bank corporation may elect 
to raise debt financing under a structured model is to reduce funding costs [Esty (2003), Roever 
and Fabozzi (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. If borrowers use SF 
transactions to facilitate lower funding costs relative to traditional funding sources, we should 
expect the WAS to negatively influence the probability of a firm choosing a PF or an AS deal 
over a CB deal.12 
The results of these tests are reported in models [3] to [6] of Table 8. Regardless the 
proxy for credit risk we use, our results show, as expected, that firms that are less creditworthy 
on average prefer SF to CF transactions. In PF, the off-balance sheet treatment of the funding 
                                                 
12 We use the Altman’s (1993) Z-score as an overall measure of the default risk, which depends on the value of 
various financial ratios of the firm (issuer for CB deals, originator for AS deals, and sponsor for PF deals). The 
higher the Z-score, the lower is the risk of the firm’s bankruptcy. We do not include Z-score and WAS variables 
in the initial model due to the significant reduction in the number of observations that this would impose: 1,181 
and 1,061 observations for Z-score in models [1] and [2], respectively; 1,607 and 1,261 observations for WAS. 
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raised by the SPV is crucial for sponsors, since it only has limited impact on sponsors’ 
creditworthiness, and does not impact sponsors’ ability to access additional financing in the 
future. Hence, firms with lower Z-scores prefer PF over CB as it prevents contamination risk: 
the separation of projects in an SPV avoids that the new project contaminates the firm or other 
projects with a positive NPV and thus further reduce their creditworthiness. By removing assets 
from balance sheet, AS can improve the originators’ key financial ratios, namely leverage and 
return on assets. Additionally, for firms with worse credit ratings, AS allows the issuance of 
bonds with a higher credit rating than the originator’s general obligations. This happens 
because the credit quality of the issued securities is based on the underlying pool of assets, not 
the issuer’s credit rating. 
**** Insert Table 8 about here **** 
Concerning the impact of WAS on the choice between SF and CF deals, results 
presented in models [4] and [6] show that while there is an insignificant relationship between 
our cost of funding proxy and the probability of observing an PF deal, the WAS affects 
negatively the probability of observing an AS deal vis-à-vis a CB deal. Thus, our results only 
support SF literature for AS: firms use AS deals to reduce the cost of borrowing. We investigate 
further this effect in section 5, where we examine if SF transactions are more or less expensive 
than CF transactions, after controlling for other micro and macro pricing characteristics. 
4.4. Robustness checks 
In this section, we report the results of some robustness checks we have undertaken on 
our main findings. Our first test investigates whether additional firms’ characteristics drives 
our key findings. We thus examine if the firms’ ability to pay short-term obligations affects 
debt choices and find a positive relationship between the current ratio and the likelihood of 
borrowing through PF and AS markets instead of CB markets. Second, we replace the LLSV’s 
(1998) index with the Spamann’s (2010) index and add the type of law regime – civil law 
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versus common law – as investor protection measures. We also re-estimated models [1] and 
[2], after adding a measure for local factors – GDP per capita logarithm – and we find that our 
results do not change qualitatively. Finally, we investigate the role of a firm’s reputation on the 
choice between SF and SDF. In line with Hale and Santos (2008), we rely on the history of 
firms’ credit risk to define their reputation by allowing for a non-linear impact of the Z-score 
in the probability of observing a PF or an AS deal versus a CB deal. Re-estimating models [3] 
and [5] after including the quartiles of the distribution of these scores yield exactly the same 
results: the coefficients on all the quartiles of Z-score are significant and negative and our 
estimates for the remaining variables are not affected by it. 
 
5. Cost of funding and firms’ debt choice 
5.1. Methodology 
Extant literature on SF and security design [Diamond (1993), Allen and Winton (1995), 
Hart and Moore (1995), Winton (1995), Caselli and Gatti (2005), and Sannikov (2013)] leads 
us to hypothesize that SF transactions reduce funding costs by mitigating market imperfection 
costs and improving risk management. If SF transactions facilitate lower funding costs relative 
to traditional funding sources, the WAS for CB deals should exceed that of PF and AS deals. 
Although a thorough analysis of the determinants of debt pricing is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we test this hypothesis by using the model described in equation (2). The dependent 
variable is the WAS and we create two dummy variables set equal to 1 if the transaction is a 
PF deal (PF) or an AS deal (AS), and 0 otherwise. 
 𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑 ×
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where the subscripts refers to deal i at time t. The list of controls includes those used in 
the logistic models presented in section 4. We employ OLS regression techniques and adjust 




by year. Our previous results (see 4.3.) show that while there is an insignificant relationship 
between the WAS and the likelihood of observing PF vis-à-vis CB, the overall cost of debt 
affects negatively the choice between AS and CB deals. We thus should expect a significant 
negative impact of the AS dummy on WAS and an insignificant relationship between the PF 
dummy and WAS. 
Before presenting the results from estimating equation (2), it is important to explain 
how our dependent variable, WAS, used as a proxy for the overall cost of credit, is computed. 
The spread corresponds to the price for the risk associated with the financing instrument at 
closing. For PF loans, the credit spread represents the spread paid by the borrower over 3-
month Euribor or 3-month Libor plus the facility fee (all-in-spread-drawn). For PF and AS 
bonds as well as for CB issues, the spread is defined as the margin yielded by the security at 
issue above a corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity (option 
adjusted spread).13 The comparability of our pricing variables across loans and bonds can be 
improved by making the following adjustment: while in PF loans, the benchmark priced off 
Euribor or Libor is a three-month interbank rate, bonds typically carry a spread over a 
benchmark government security, such as German Treasury bonds. Therefore, there is a 
difference between the two benchmarks represented by different credit risk levels involving 
unsecured short-term bank risk and a risk-free government rate. Following the approach of 
Thomas and Wang (2004) and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), we adjust for the risk difference of 
the bond and loan benchmarks by adding to the Euribor or Libor spread of the PF loans the 
difference between the three-month Euro Libor and the three-month German Treasury bill at 
the time when the loans were granted. Despite the adjustment, we are aware that the 
                                                 
13 Previous empirical studies commonly use the all-in-spread-drawn (AISD) as a proxy for the cost of capital in 
syndicated loans [Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), and Gatti et al. (2013)]. 
Similarly, the margin between a bond’s contractual yield and that of a comparable maturity treasury benchmark 
commonly proxies for a bond’s economic cost of credit [Gabbi and Sironi (2005), Vink and Thibeault (2008), and 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008)]. 
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comparability between loans and bonds has some drawbacks, including that bonds and loans 
may have different levels of liquidity and different covenants, and that fees are an important 
part of debt contracting. 
5.2. Results 
Column 1 of Table 9 reports estimates of equation (2) for a sample of 256 PF, 121 AS, 
and 2,914 CB deals. The results suggest that AS transactions in Western Europe are associated 
with lower WAS, holding other factors constant, since the AS dummy variable is associated 
with a statistically significant 91.12 bps drop in WAS. On the other hand, PF deals’ cost of 
funding does not differ significantly from that of CB deals. In order to check whether these 
findings are robust over time, we re-estimate model [7] for the pre-crisis period from January 
1, 2000 through to September 14, 2008 and the crisis period from September 15, 2008 (the first 
trading day after Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing the day before) through December 31, 
2016. Our results indicate that during both the pre-crisis (model [7a]) and crisis (model [7b]) 
periods, while AS deals have lower WAS than CB deals, PF deals WAS does not differ 
significantly from that of CB deals. Therefore, we only corroborate the hypothesis raised by 
the SF literature that the funding cost on SF is lower than the funding cost on CF for AS 
transactions.14 AS allows originators to reduce borrowing costs when bonds created through 
securitization have, on average, a higher credit rating or are otherwise perceived to have less 
risk than that of originators. AS transforms pools of assets into securitized tranches 
characterized by different risk-return properties. In AS transactions, issuers work with rating 
agencies to articulate the tranching and to define the necessary credit enhancement mechanisms 
to improve the security’s credit rating and reduce the risks transferred to investors. 
 
                                                 
14 To eliminate the comparability problem between loans and bonds identified in section 5.1, we re-estimate model 
[7] in Table 9 by eliminating PF loans from the sample. Results show that both AS and PF bond deals have lower 
WAS than CB deals. However, we do not present the results because the sample contains only 22 PF bond deals. 
We consider that a further analysis using a larger database of PF deals is an important avenue for future research. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
This paper provides empirical evidence on corporate borrowing decisions, namely on 
the factors that influence the choice between corporate financing (CF) and structured finance 
(SF) transactions. Our results document that sampled firms’ characteristics, like size, 
profitability, leverage, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, and credit risk influence the 
firms’ choice between SF and CF deals. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that SF 
promotes the reduction of the deadweight costs associated with information asymmetries and 
provide support for the flotation costs hypothesis of debt choice between project finance and 
corporate bonds. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that SF transactions, 
especially in the form of asset securitization, are more effective in mitigating agency conflicts 
between borrowers and lenders, than corporate bonds. Additionally, results confirm the 
prediction that borrowers with less favorable prospects and, unable or unwilling, to take in the 
risk liquidity inherent to interim renegotiation, will self-select into contracting longer-term 
financing, therefore choosing SF over CF for long-term financing. 
We provide evidence on reduced borrowing costs for asset securitization deals, vis-à-
vis corporate bonds, but not for project finance. We interpret this result as evidence that rational 
borrowers choose between SF and CF based on the cost of capital efficiency of the available 
financing alternatives.15 Therefore, we argue, that further research exploring if SF transactions 
reduce sponsors’ or originators’ overall cost of capital, as well as on firms’ relative use of these 
funding sources, would be particularly useful and valuable. 
  
                                                 
15 For example, the decision to go with a project finance transaction, or with a corporate bond issuance, should be 
based on the trade-off between the composite cost of capital of the project finance, and the sponsor’s, and the 
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Table 1: Definition of variables and findings 
 
Notes: A “–” indicates negative impact on the probability of a firm to choose PF deals over CB deals or AS deals 
over CB deals. A “+” indicates positive impact on the probability of a firm to choose PF deals over CB deals or 
AS deals over CB deals. An “I” indicates insignificant impact.  
 
  
PF versus CB 
deals
AS versus CB 
deals
Corporate characteristics
Log total assets Logarithm of firm total assets measured in € million. - -
Debt to total assets The ratio of total debt to total assets. I / + I / +
Short-term debt to total debt The ratio of short-term debt to total debt. Short-term debt measures debt 
maturing within 1 year.
- I / +
Fixed assets to total assets The ratio of fixed assets to total assets. - -
Market to book ratio The sum of book value of liabilities and market value of equity divided by 
the book value of assets. I / - I / +
Return on assets The net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend 
requirement, divided by total assets.
- -
Switcher Dummy equal to 1 if firms used both debt instrument types within our 
sample period and 0, otherwise.
+ +
Log Z-score Logarithm of Altman’s (1993) Z-score. The higher the Z-score, the lower 
is the risk of the firm’s bankruptcy. 
- -
Contractual characteristics
Weighted average spread The weighted average between the tranche spread and its weight in the 
deal size. Corresponds to the deal’s economic cost of credit.
I -
Log deal size Logarithm of the deal size measured in € million. - I / +
Weighted average maturity The weighted average between the tranche maturity, in years, and its 
weight in the deal size.
+ +
Number of tranches Number of tranches per deal. + +
Number of banks Number of financial institutions participating in the debt issuance. + -
Macroeconomic factors
Country risk S&P's country credit rating at closing date; the rating is converted as 
follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. 
I I / +
UK borrowers Dummy equal to 1 if the sponsor/originator/issuer is located in the U.K. 
and 0, otherwise.
- I
Creditor rights Measured using La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1998) 
and Spamann’s (2010) indices.
+ I / +
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the deals' issuance/closing date falls within the crisis 
period (September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2016) and 0, otherwise.
I -
Risk free rate The three-month German Treasury bill at the time of issuance/closing the 
deals - a proxy for the general level of interest rates.
I I
Volatility The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). VIX reflects 
a market estimate of future volatility.
I / + I / +
EUSA5y-Libor3M The Euro swap curve slope. Obtained as the between the five-year Euro 
swap rate and the 3-month LIBOR rate.
I / - I
Variables Description
Findings | Choice of debt
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Table 2: Distribution of the full sample of deals by year 
 
Table 2 describes the distribution of the full sample of deals by year. Data are for deals reported in DCM Analytics 
and Loan Analytics with deal amount available, closed by Western European non-financial firms during the 2000–
2016 period. For CB, deals with perpetual bonds and bonds with additional features such as step-up, caps, or 






















2000 47 13,376.94 2.85% 26 16,109.37 7.00% 244 156,880.63 4.50%
2001 49 12,356.12 2.63% 37 27,118.71 11.79% 271 185,162.40 5.31%
2002 32 10,744.80 2.29% 22 21,089.67 9.17% 206 113,013.46 3.24%
2003 60 20,574.16 4.38% 41 28,115.35 12.22% 259 152,664.33 4.38%
2004 65 12,236.84 2.60% 24 18,182.06 7.90% 206 95,210.05 2.73%
2005 52 14,126.27 3.01% 37 31,296.27 13.61% 200 93,729.16 2.69%
2006 47 15,432.14 3.29% 43 34,692.69 15.08% 237 154,866.44 4.44%
2007 92 22,319.50 4.75% 25 19,872.66 8.64% 180 121,232.21 3.47%
2008 241 46,620.75 9.92% 7 5,534.19 2.41% 242 141,856.42 4.07%
2009 181 33,820.49 7.20% 4 1,691.34 0.74% 396 318,228.20 9.12%
2010 210 45,338.73 9.65% 3 1,650.00 0.72% 351 179,405.89 5.14%
2011 172 40,558.70 8.63% 3 1,684.42 0.73% 375 178,381.14 5.11%
2012 136 27,840.36 5.93% 8 4,931.22 2.14% 620 325,778.11 9.34%
2013 153 35,138.28 7.48% 7 4,727.42 2.06% 640 285,169.53 8.17%
2014 143 30,976.22 6.59% 12 6,534.58 2.84% 670 308,250.74 8.83%
2015 220 38,907.76 8.28% 10 4,208.98 1.83% 536 298,508.53 8.56%
2016 231 49,395.20 10.51% 4 2,584.61 1.12% 513 380,695.74 10.91%
Total 2,131 469,763.24 100.00% 313 230,023.54 100.00% 6,146 3,489,032.97 100.00%
Year
Project Finance deals Asset Securitization deals Corporate Bond deals
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Table 3: Industrial and geographic distribution of the full sample of deals 
 
Panel A describes the industrial distribution of the full sample of deals, whereas Panel B detail the deal allocation 
to borrowers in a particular country. Data are for deals reported in DCM Analytics and Loan Analytics with deal 
amount available, closed by Western European non-financial firms during the 2000–2016 period. For CB, deals 
with perpetual bonds and bonds with additional features such as step-up, caps, or floors were excluded from our 










Commercial 12.02 37.03 34.27
Industrial   33.79 26.06 44.89
Utility and energy 36.98 5.99 15.34
Transportation 15.26 12.65 5.14
Public administration/Government 1.96 18.27 0.36








Austria 0.50 1.51 0.98
Belgium 2.38 0.52 3.93
Cyprus 0.05 - 0.01
Denmark 0.37 - 0.01
Finland 1.28 0.16 1.19
France 10.30 11.59 21.81
Germany 6.70 14.59 21.76
Greece 2.71 1.73 0.76
Iceland 0.13 - 0.01
Ireland 1.55 1.48 1.35
Italy 8.57 23.08 8.56
Luxembourg 0.36 0.13 1.22
Netherlands 5.33 6.33 6.69
Norway 1.34 - -
Portugal 5.16 1.85 1.29
Spain 24.02 0.74 6.16
Sweden 3.28 - 0.06
Switzerland 0.96 - 0.14
United Kingdom 25.01 36.30 24.07
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel A: Percentage of deal volume by industry
Panel B: Percentage of deal volume by country
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for deals’ contractual characteristics 
 
Table 4 presents contractual characteristics for the high-information sample of deals to firms in W.E. countries. 
Each cell contains means and parenthetic medians for continuous variables’ and percents and parenthetic levels 
for discrete variables’. We test for similar distributions in contractual characteristics using the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test for continuous variables and the Fisher's exact test for discrete ones. 1 Weighted average spread (WAS) 
is the weighted average between the tranche spread and its weight in the deal size. For PF loans, the WAS is the 
sum of the all-in-spread-drawn and the difference between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month German Treasury yield 
at the time of the closing. For bonds, the WAS is the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding 
currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity. 2 Country rating is the S&P's country credit rating at 
closing date; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. 3 Weighted 
average maturity is the weighted average between the tranche maturity and its weight in the deal size. 4 Crisis 
period: from September 15, 2008 (the first trading day after Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing the day before) 
through December 31, 2016. a indicates significant difference at the 1% level between PF and CB deals. b indicates 
significant difference at the 1% level between AS and CB deals.  
  
Continuous variables:




















































































PF deals AS deals CB deals
N = 4,218N = 582 N = 170
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for firms’ characteristics 
 
Table 5 presents non-financial firms’ characteristics for the high-information sample of deals to firms in W.E. 
countries. Each cell contains means and parenthetic medians. We test for similar distributions in non-financial 
firms’ characteristics across samples via the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. a denotes statistical difference at the 1% 
level between ‘PF deals only’ and ‘CB deals only’ samples. b denotes statistical difference at the 1% level 
between ‘PF deals only’ and ‘PF and CB deals’ samples. c denotes statistical difference at the 1% level between 
‘CB deals only’ and ‘PF and CB deals’ samples. d denotes statistical difference at the 1% level between ‘AS 
deals only’ and ‘CB deals only’ samples. e denotes statistical difference at the 1% level between ‘AS deals only’ 
and ‘AS and SD deals’ samples. f denotes statistical difference at the 1% level between ‘CB deals only’ and ‘AS 
and CB deals’ samples. Short-term debt includes debt maturing within 1 year. Market to book ratio is defined as 
the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Return on 






AS bonds and 
SD bonds
(N = 816 )












(3,439.69) (20,296.00) (30,226.00) (7,550.11) (16,393.00) (88,277.00)










(33.80%) (35.11%) (32.09%) (42.99%) (33.00%) (42.77%)












(16.37%) (23.72%) (19.20%) (14.00%) (21.45%) (40.84%)





(31.67%) (31.63%) (42.61%) (31.15%) (34.71%) (30.31%)










(76.17%) (79.54%) (69.71%) (83.06%) (79.78%) (75.13%)












(3.96%) (4.85%) (3.76%) (4.08%) (5.15%) (3.75%)
[III]
PF and CB deals
(N = 713 )
[I]
PF deals only
(N = 354 )
[II]
CB deals only
(N = 3,733 )
[IV]
AS deals only
(N = 51 )
[V]
CB deals only
(N = 3,521 )
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Table 6: Determinants of firms’ choice 
 
Table 6 presents results of logistic regressions, which predict non-financial firms’ choice between debt types. In 
model [1], the dependent variable equals 1 when a firm closes a PF deal and 0 when it issues a CB deal. In model 
[2], the dependent variable equals 1 when a firm issues an AS deal and 0 when it issues a CB deal. Short-term 
debt measures debt maturing within 1 year. Market to book ratio is defined as the sum of book value of liabilities 
and market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Return on assets is defined as net income before 
preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement, divided by total assets. Switcher is an indicator 












Debt to total assets 0.003 0.004
**
(0.134) (0.025)











































































Number of observations 4,800 4,388










AS deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
[2]
PF deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
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average maturity is the weighted average between the tranche maturity and its weight in the deal size. Country 
risk is the S&P's country credit rating at debt issuance; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, 
AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. Creditor rights are measured using La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1998) and Spamann’s (2010) indices. Crisis equals 1 if the issue date falls within the crisis period 
(September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2016) and 0, otherwise (January 1, 2000 – September 14, 2008). Risk free 
rate is the yield on a three-month German Treasury bill. Volatility is the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index (VIX). EUSA5y-LIBOR3M is the difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-
month LIBOR rate. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second 
row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
clustered by year. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7: The impact of the financial crisis on the firms’ choice 
 
Table 7 presents results of logistic regressions which predict non-financial firms’ choice between PF and CB 
deals (models [1a] and [1b]) and between AS and CB deals (models [2a] and [2b]) in the pre-crisis (January 1, 
2000 through September 14, 2008) and crisis (September 15, 2008 through December 31, 2016) sub-periods. 
Short-term debt measures debt maturing within 1 year. Market to book ratio is defined as the sum of book value 
of liabilities and market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Return on assets is defined as net 
income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement, divided by total assets. Switcher is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if firms used both debt instrument types within our sample period and 0, otherwise. 
Weighted average maturity is the weighted average between the tranche maturity and its weight in the deal size. 
Country risk is the S&P's country credit rating at debt issuance; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, 









(0.007) (0.154) (0.000) (0.791)






(0.000) (0.000) (0.309) (0.009)





(0.074) (0.618) (0.062) (0.707)





(0.000) (0.332) (0.019) (0.607)






(0.000) (0.069) (0.199) (0.000)
Market to book ratio -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.006
(0.133) (0.389) (0.510) (0.219)














(0.002) (0.000) (0.941) (0.402)
Industrial -0.368 -0.460 -0.399 -0.933
(0.428) (0.172) (0.562) (0.245)
Utility and energy 0.095 0.656
**
-0.773 -0.607









(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)






(0.000) (0.000) (0.475) (0.079)







(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130)








(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)








(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Country risk -0.005 0.046 0.606
***
-0.034














(0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.245)
Risk free rate 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.005








(0.000) (0.282) (0.394) (0.253)
Number of observations 1,776 3,024 1,702 2,686









Correct predictions 95.32% 92.61% 95.95% 98.75%
Pseudo-R
2









PF deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
PF deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
AS deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
AS deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
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Vishny’s (1998) and Spamann’s (2010) indices. Risk free rate is the yield on a three-month German Treasury 
bill. Volatility is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). EUSA5y-LIBOR3M is the 
difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-month LIBOR rate. For each independent variable, 
the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated 
based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by year. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 8: Determinants of firms’ choice: the impact of credit risk and funding costs 
 
Table 8 presents results of logistic regressions which predict non-financial firms’ choice between PF and CB 
deals (models [3] and [4]) and between AS and CB deals (models [5] and [6]). Short-term debt measures debt 
maturing within 1 year. Market to book ratio is defined as the sum of book value of liabilities and market value 
of equity divided by the book value of assets. Return on assets is defined as net income before preferred dividends 
minus preferred dividend requirement, divided by total assets. Switcher is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firms 
used both debt instrument types within our sample period and 0, otherwise. Weighted average maturity is the 
weighted average between the tranche maturity and its weight in the deal size. Country risk is the S&P's country 
credit rating at debt issuance; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until 










(0.007) (0.341) (0.045) (0.056)








(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt to total assets -0.002 0.008 0.018 0.040
***
(0.719) (0.272) (0.160) (0.002)





(0.019) (0.022) (0.277) (0.769)




(0.000) (0.426) (0.332) (0.029)




(0.014) (0.408) (0.130) (0.001)

















(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)







(0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.400)








(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)








(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)








(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country risk -0.001 -0.018 0.094 0.118












(0.000) (0.000) (0.344) (0.886)
Crisis -0.094 0.284 -2.655
**
-1.418
(0.896) (0.620) (0.014) (0.174)
Risk free rate 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001

















Weighted average spread -0.001 -0.016
**
(0.875) (0.027)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 3,619 3,193 3,327 3,127









Correct predictions 92.29% 96.18% 97.99% 98.15%
Pseudo-R
2
0.455 0.459 0.534 0.601
[4] [5] [6]
PF deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
PF deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
AS deal = 1,
CB deal = 0
AS deal = 1,




Spamann’s (2010) indices. Crisis equals 1 if the issue date falls within the crisis period (September 15, 2008 – 
December 31, 2016) and 0, otherwise (January 1, 2000 – September 14, 2008). Risk free rate is the yield on a 
three-month German Treasury bill. Volatility is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). 
EUSA5y-LIBOR3M is the difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-month LIBOR rate. Z-
score is computed as proposed by Altman (1993). WAS is the weighted average between the tranche spread and 
its weight in the deal size. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the 
second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors clustered by year. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 9: Regression analyses of the cost of funding and the debt financing choice 
 
Table 9 presents the results of OLS regressions analyzing the determinants of PF, AS and CB deals weighted 
average spread (WAS). The WAS is the weighted average between the tranche spread and its weight in the deal 
size. For PF loans, the WAS is the sum of the all-in-spread-drawn and the difference between 3-month LIBOR 
and 3-month German Treasury yield at the time of the closing. For bonds, the WAS is the margin yielded by the 
security at issue above a corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity. PF equals 1 if 
the deal is a PF deal and 0, otherwise. AS equals 1 if the deal is an AS deal and 0, otherwise. Short-term debt 
measures debt maturing within 1 year. Market to book ratio is defined as the sum of book value of liabilities and 
market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Return on assets is defined as net income before 
preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement, divided by total assets. Weighted average maturity is 
the weighted average between the tranche maturity and its weight in the deal size. Country risk is the S&P's 
country credit rating at debt issuance; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on 
until D=22. Creditor rights are measured using La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1998) and 
Spamann’s (2010) indices. Crisis equals 1 if the issue date falls within the crisis period (September 15, 2008 – 
December 31, 2016) and 0, otherwise (January 1, 2000 – September 14, 2008). Risk free rate is the yield on a 
Dependent variable:











































Market to book ratio -0.044 -0.009 -0.101
*
(0.148) (0.654) (0.081)







Log deal size -5.957 11.812 -16.994
(0.636) (0.302) (0.306)




















UK borrowers 16.848 14.778 23.216
(0.101) (0.319) (0.155)



















Industry fixed effects yes yes yes













three-month German Treasury bill. Volatility is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). 
EUSA5y-LIBOR3M is the difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-month LIBOR rate. For 
each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. 
Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by year. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
